Introduction

The Arctic has been receiving increasing attention from the international arena beyond its boundaries. As well as becoming a geopolitical hotspot due to the presence of oil, gas and mineral deposits, the region is home to unique ecosystems and diverse indigenous cultures. The Russian Federation owns 53% of the coastline adjacent to the Arctic Ocean. The geographical and geopolitical position of this country is then crucial to ensure the environmental well-being of the region, particularly as the effects of climate change are becoming increasingly felt in the loss of sea ice, thawing of permafrost and melting of glaciers. In fact, temperatures are rising, along with the tense political climate between superpowers interested in controlling resources in this region.

Within this landscape, Arctida was born in 2022 as a not-for-profit media and research organisation aiming to raise awareness on the Russian Arctic through independent journalistic investigations and research conducted by a team of independent experts. In addition to their own investigations, Arctida also collaborates with media outlets both in and outside of Russia. The founder of Arctida, Ilia Shumanov, previously worked as executive director of Transparency International Russia, translating his experience in anti-corruption investigations on Russian companies and government agencies into an Arctic context. Transparency International Russia was then listed by the government as an “undesirable organisation” in March 2023, setting off some initial disinformation campaigns against Shumanov.

Shumanov’s interest in the Arctic began to grow in isolation: “I started thinking about the Arctic during the COVID-pandemic. The first trip I did after this was a small expedition there, it was my first time being faced with the Russian north. This touched me deeply.” After this trip, Shumanov began thinking about climate change issues and the global impact of the Russian Arctic environment and he co-founded the not-for-profit Arctida in 2022, filling an important gap in the country, as other not-for-profit organisations such as Greenpeace were designated as ‘undesirable’. Co-founder Marina Guryeva adds: “I was deeply disturbed by the devastating fires in the Russian Arctic in 2021, and the issue struck a chord with Ilia”. This led them to collaborate and Arctida was born as a way to further explore climate change, ecological disasters, indigenous rights and kleptocracy in the northern regions through investigations, news articles, research and media outputs. In Shumanov’s words: “This was a new way of thinking about Russia.”

Following some recent investigations conducted by Arctida on climate lobbying and the environmental and human costs of coal mining in the indigenous Chukotka region, Arctida soon became the target of Russian media campaigns aiming to discredit the organisation’s work and defame its founder. Here we take a closer look into the disinformation strategies used by these outlets to blacken the name of Ilia Shumanov, as well as the wider political and environmental landscape these attempts emerge from.

Political landscape

Since Vladimir Putin’s rise to power in 2000, human rights have been in steady decline in Russia and the free press has gradually been dismantled. This downward trajectory has been marked by a continuous flow of repressive legislation, amendments and judicial persecution. At the same time, state-controlled media have waged a propaganda campaign, labeling anyone who challenges the government’s policies as traitors.

Since 2021 several media outlets have been declared as ‘undesirable’, meaning they are banned from operating in Russia. Additionally anybody who is in contact with an undesirable organisation will face administrative liability, which escalates to criminal charges of imprisonment up to six years if the involvement continues. Consequently, it is extremely unsafe for sources inside the country to collaborate with designated media outlets, promoting the false semblance of a lacking opposition. With regards to Arctida, Shumanov states: “Our modus operandi was built as if we were already a designated organisation. From the start we have been based outside of Russia because of this risk.”

Russia’s full scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 resulted in further efforts to suppress independent reporting and dissent. Amendments to the country’s criminal and administrative codes on 4 March 2022 signaled the beginning of a new and dangerous era for journalists. Under these changes, anyone found guilty of knowingly disseminating so-called ‘fake news’ on the Russian military contradicting official sources, or discrediting the army may face fines or prison sentences of up to 15 years. Subsequent amendments expanded these to include criticism of volunteer fighters and other state institutions operating abroad.

Another legal mechanism used to silence independent media is the ‘foreign agent’ designation, which carries social stigma, imposes heavy bureaucratic burdens, and enforces legal restrictions that make daily operations increasingly difficult. Journalists and media outlets must register with authorities, submit regular reports on their activities and finances, and clearly mark all published content with their designated status. Failure to comply results in administrative penalties and even criminal liability. Initially, the law targeted NGOs receiving foreign funding but by 2022, new legislation and amendments had significantly tightened regulations, expanding the designation to include anyone considered to be under foreign influence, resulting in authorities arbitrarily prosecuting journalists. In March 2024, affected outlets were stripped of what was for many a vital revenue stream – advertising – after a new law was passed prohibiting foreign agents from placing or receiving advertisements. Consequently several independent media outlets shut down or drastically scaled back. Russian citizens posting content online related to foreign agents also run the risk of being penalised. Since January 2025, Russian courts have issued fines to individuals mentioning foreign agents without indicating their official status, making regulations even more arbitrary.

As a result of the increased crackdown on free speech, repression and threats towards media professionals following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, most independent journalists and media outlets have been driven into exile, while reporting from within Russia has grown increasingly challenging and dangerous. The CPJ (Committee to Protect Journalists) reports that between 24 February 2022 and 17 April 2025 the Russian authorities have designated 272 journalists and media outlets as ‘foreign agents’ and declared 22 media outlets as undesirable, while 26 journalists have been imprisoned. Internet censorship is also widespread, with over 18,500 websites blocked in connection with coverage of the war in Ukraine.

Within this landscape of press unfreedom, independent journalists reporting on the Arctic region face further challenges in their work. As the Arctic is of critical importance to the Kremlin due to its connections to geopolitical influence, economic power and national security, attempts to report on the environmental challenges in the region may be viewed as a threat to those Russian actors who are attempting to profit from the resource rush and emerging strategic routes. Local media in the Russian Arctic is either state-controlled or owned by Russian corporations, and primarily functions to amplify the Kremlin’s narrative. For independent journalists, traveling to the region poses significant challenges. Not only is it expensive, but much of the Russian Arctic consists of closed areas due to their military, strategic, and industrial importance.  The archipelago consists of designated military areas, and access to major cities like Norilsk requires a special travel permit, which is typically denied to critical or independent voices.

While almost 30% of the world’s ecosystems are on the brink of collapse, the Arctic tundra and boreal forest are some of the most affected ecosystems in times of climate change. The Arctic is a fragile ecosystem whose stability affects the entire planet: as Arctic resilience perishes, so do the rest of the world’s ecosystems. This is not news. Nevertheless, as the Arctic ice is melting, national governments scramble to exploit natural resources in the region (such as the mineral deposits beneath the ocean floor), seize new shipping routes, and make use of strategic locations for military and geopolitical purposes.

For Russia, the region holds major importance due to the above factors. Militarily, the Arctic is also home to the Northern Fleet, the biggest of Russia’s four fleets, with headquarters located in Severomorsk, north of Murmansk. This serves as a base for nuclear submarines and missile defense systems, making it central to Russia’s deterrence strategy. Economically, the Arctic holds vast untapped reserves of oil, gas, and critical minerals, as well as fisheries and timber, which are resources the Kremlin perceives as vital for the country’s economy and national security, especially under Western sanctions. This importance has been explicitly expressed by the Russian government in two policies relating to the approaches to the Arctic towards 2020 and 2035.      

Strategically, the Northern Sea Route is becoming a viable trade corridor between Europe and Asia as climate change melts the Arctic sea ice. Russia aims to control and profit from it by requiring foreign ships to use Russian infrastructure and services. Beyond strategy and economics, the Arctic also holds deep symbolic value. It’s tied to Russian identity as a frontier of resilience and innovation. In this regard, Russia has also filed claims to extend its continental shelf far into the Arctic ocean under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, reinforcing its push for sovereignty in the resource rich region.

In these circumstances, the Arctic population in this region takes on special significance. The Russian Arctic is populated by around 160 indigenous peoples, of which 40 are officially recognised. In recent years communities have faced severe repression in terms of freedom of expression, self-determination and other cultural rights, along with racism, xenophobia and other forms of discrimination. For example, following the full scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, young men from indigenous minorities were disproportionately affected by enlistment and death rates in the conflict. Important struggles faced by indigenous peoples in Russia also revolve around land and resource rights as an important article of the Land Code of the Russian Federation was revoked in 2015, transferring power away from communities to local authorities on decisions regarding the interference of business and other resource users in these areas [Item 3 of Art. 31 of the Land code of the Russian Federation before entry into force of the changes made by 171- FZ].

In July 2024, several Indigenous Peoples’ and national minorities’ rights organisations were classed as ‘extremist organisations’ by Russian authorities, on the grounds of posing a threat to national security as a ‘structural divisions’ of the ‘Anti-Russian Separatist Movement’, a movement that does not in fact formally exist but any affiliation to this is punished with up to 6 years of imprisonment. Hence, the organisations’ activities were banned on Russian territory, and participants and supporters risked criminal charges. The recent crackdown on indigenous rights organisations, as well as indigenous people themselves, can be understood as connected to the Kremlin’s environmental interests in the Arctic regions of Russia.

While many view the Arctic melting as a climate crisis, other countries including Russia, U.S. and Canada have reassessed their interests in the region, recognising the strategic opportunity to advance economic and geopolitical interests and enhancing their influence in the Arctic. Particularly when it comes to green energy, Russian president Vladimir Putin made it clear that while carbon neutrality does not damage the country’s interests, the Kremlin views the renewable energy transition as a threat to its interests. This is due to the resource competition, reduced funding of fossil-fuels and increased potential for an energy crisis that this transition could present.

Due to the dangers and risks faced by independent journalists, evidence-based climate reporting that contradicts the Kremlin’s narrative of the Russian Arctic is nearly impossible to carry out from within Russia. The work of Ilia Shumanov and his team of experts presents an important example of this, as Arctida continues to investigate the environmental challenges of the Russian Arctic from abroad in the fight for sustainability and transparency in the region.

Chronology of the attacks against Ilia Shumanov

Disinformation campaigns against Ilia Shumanov began in his role as executive director of Transparency International Russia. The organisation was classed as a foreign agent in 2015, before escalating to undesirable in March 2023, when the Prosecutor General’s Office of the Russian Federation identified its “threat to constitutional order” and “interference in the internal affairs of the country.” Shumanov was designated a ‘foreign agent’ in October 2022, the year he fled Russia following the invasion of Ukraine. He was designated five days after founding Arctida.

Further disinformation appeared in pro-Russian Telegram channels Systemic Pesticide (This Telegram channel has 13.000 followers and describes itself as a channel revealing “the full backstory of foreign agent pests, undesirable organizations, various investigators, and so-called well-wishers who pose a threat to modern society.”) and Underside (This Telegram channel has 14.000 followers and is described itself by the historical Russian saying “The Englishwoman is making a mess” used sarcastically or ideologically to blame Britain (and more broadly the West) for undermining Russia’s good intentions.) from 2022 to 2023. In the three posts analysed, Shumanov was labelled as a foreign agent, whereas Transparency International was described as a dangerous organisation destabilising Russia, accused of being linked to Western governments, intelligence and funding. Shumanov is portrayed as an agent of Western influence by these campaigns to frame him as disloyal and serving external agendas.

According to the channel Systemic Pesticide, accused of being openly pro-Kremlin, “‘fighting corruption’ is a favourite tool of Western countries for direct interference in the internal affairs of individual states. By pouring huge money into programmes [such as those by Transparency International], they work with oppositionists on the ground and strengthen the positions of [these] loyal officials by promoting the necessary theses and attitudes in society.”

Ilia Shumanov was then put on the federal wanted list, an official database maintained by the Ministry of Internal Affairs which includes individuals suspected of having evaded Russian laws, in August 2024. The list includes Ukrainian soldiers, opposition figures, journalists, and politicians, such as Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas and Estonian Secretary of State Taimar Peterkop, who were added for removing Soviet-era memorials. The anti-corruption work conducted by Shumanov earned him the title possibly due to his role as head of the Transparency International ‘Russia in Exile’, the organisation’s Russian branch which continues its work from abroad, and following some important investigations on transparency and sustainability in the Russian Arctic.

September: first attacks against Arctida

On the morning of 12 September 2024, Russian RT published an article on Ilia Shumanov and his connection to the Russian Arctic, under the title ‘Foreign agents launch a grant competition for development of the Russian Arctic abroad’. The publication, formerly Russia Today, is a state-controlled international television network funded directly by the Russian government.

This shortly followed the publication of three investigations by Arctida on indigenous rights in northern Russia. The first article by Arctida was published on 2 August 2024, uncovering how industry and government agencies are using the Association of Indigenous People (RAIPON) as a lobbying tool for their interests.

This was then followed by a second article on the detrimental effects of coal mining on the environment and local communities in the Arctic region of Chukotka, which was published on 20 August 2024. The third article continued to follow conflicts between the residents of Chukotka and foreign mining interests, drawing connections between Australian coal miners, Russian officials and Ukraine’s ex-president VIktor Yanukovych’s inner circle (Viktor Yanukovych is former president of Ukraine who was part of the pro-Russian Party of Regions; the “inner circle” of his administration include his two sons, their godfathers, close friends and other controversial figures.). This was published on 27 August 2024.

The first disinformation attack against Arctida fits into the nationalistic narrative which accuses Shumanov of breeding separatist sentiments through Western ties. In fact, RT reports on the launch of a grant contest named ‘Accelerator of Arctic Projects’ as a collaboration between Arctida and Reforum Space Vilnius, a community center for exiled Russian journalists, NGOs and activists. This contest was developed to support organisations and projects addressing issues in the Russian Arctic with small grants of $5.000,00. The article highlights how organisers and participants take part outside of Russia, as Shumanov who “has been living in Europe for several years and criticises Russian politics and the SVO,” that is the Russian invasion of Ukraine officially referred to in Russia as ‘special military operation’.

Despite the small budgets, with which “the problems of the Arctic cannot be solved” as “trillions of rubles are needed”, the outlet RT highlights how this initiative aims to develop separatist sentiments in the “north and north-west of Russia” and “create an unfavourable information atmosphere around the Russian Arctic in the West.” In this way, the article accuses Arctida of posing threats to Russia’s integrity and role in the Arctic through its articles and investigations.

RT’s article also emphasises the narrative that Shumanov has been declared on the federal wanted list in August 2024, on the grounds of being a foreign agent, just after the publication of Arctida’s most recent investigations on the Arctic: this represents one of the cornerstones of Russian disinformation and repression. While framing Arctida as the work of one foreign agent attempting to publish defamatory articles about the Russian Arctic, this also undermines the team of independent experts who carry out the organisation’s research. Moreover, Arctida is presented in the article as an organisation reporting on the Russian development of the Arctic with foreign sponsors and funds.

November: the first warning

On 1 November 2024, around noon, an article was published by the Russian news outlet Prigovor under the title ‘Georgian dream of separatist Shumanov’ (The link to this article works with VPN only). Within this, accusations were made against Shumanov of being “involved in shady crypto pyramid schemes” and “working off a major grant aimed at the dismemberment of the Russian Arctic”. Here he is also accused of funding the project Arctida “with the money of Mikhail Khodorkovsky (Khodorkovsky was one of Russia’s most powerful businessmen in the 1990s, becoming an important voice of the Russian opposition. He left Russia in 2013 and was designated a foreign agent in May 2022.) and, presumably, western funds of the Barents region”, such as the Swedish Agency for Development and Cooperation (SIDA). However, upon inquiry, Shumanov explained that Arctida had not received any funds from SIDA as of the publication of this article in mid-April 2025.

Prigovor was able to access private information of Ilia Shumanov and the constituent documents of the organisation’s registration, completed on 17 October 2022 in Batumi, Georgia, which include the signature and handwriting of Shumanov. The place of registration, including house number and street name, was also disclosed in the article. Another address in Tbilisi is also reported in the documents, leading the news outlet to claim that “probably, it is in these apartments that the retractor-separatist lives”. Though this information is publicly available in Georgia through a Company Register, this deliberate dissemination on a Russian public channel lets malicious intents transpire.

The article becomes more worrying as a scanned copy of Ilia Shumanov’s passport is shared, along with his passport number, date and place of birth, and the information that this had been renewed in April 2024 and four months later he was designated a foreign agent on the wanted list by the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs. In addition to Ilia Shumanov’s personal information, a copy of Marina Guryeva, who co-founded Arctida together with him, was also published. This information, however, is not publicly available in Russia. It is common that Telegram channels which are close to law enforcement may derive their information from these sources, though it is difficult to prove the exact origins of the scanned passport copy that Prigovor shared.

It is specified that his passport was newly issued by a Russian Consulate General in Georgia, operating as a “Section of Interests of the Russian Federation at the Embassy of Switzerland”, thus ensuring that “[Shumanov’s] future is calm for 10 years ahead”. The code, photograph and signature were also published. This strategy clearly signals a personal warning to Shumanov through access to his personal information.

These practices present not only a way to threaten an individual, but also a violation of Russian law: the use and dissemination of personal data without the consent of its owner entails administrative liability, according to Article 13.11 of the Code of Administrative Offences (“Violating the Procedure for Collecting, Keeping, Using or Disseminating Information about Citizens (Personal Data) Established by Law”). In some cases this translates into a criminal offence, in line with Article 137 (“Violation of the inviolability of private life”) of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation.

The article continues by writing that Shumanov possesses two cryptocurrency wallets: this information can be deduced from Arctida’s website, where the organisation receives donations in bitcoin (BTC) and ethereum (ETH). These wallets exist as co-founder of Arctida, Marina Guryeva, is an expert on start-up development, innovation and blockchain technology as a tool for increasing transparency and accountability in governance. She also worked at the Higher School of Economics (HSE), which hosted the Laboratory for Anti-Corruption Policy (LAP) founded in 2009, in partnership with Transparency International Russia.

In its article, Prigovor then attempted to draw conclusions from public data available through a Blockchain analyser, a tool used to find information on a wallet’s transaction history, in an attempt to accuse Shumanov of “if not directly fraudulent, then muddy” activities. The attempt to show that someone is involved in allegedly suspicious business dealings or financing presents another important rule in the Russian playbook of disinformation.

For this report, we have tried to follow Prigorov’s dubious accusations and research steps. In doing so, we have not been able to find any problematic transactions. The article claims that the bitcoin wallet shows no transaction, while the ethereum wallet discloses more.

Cryptocurrency wallets are always linked to an individual anonymous code, which is traceable to the original code and becomes connectable to a person only when crypto is translated into money. Transactions are irreversible as they remain visible and linked to the original wallet: in other words, nobody can manipulate transactions and their connection to a specific account.

When using the wallet ID through Bitcoin Explorer, Etherscan and Ethplorer.io, no transactions can be found on the account that is linked to Arctida’s website. Prigovor also states this. When we looked back via Wayback Machine, we confirmed that the wallet linked to Arctida’s web page remains the same as it was in 2022 and 2023, ruling out the possibility that the wallet had been wiped out and another one had been added to the website.

However, when we searched for the wallet on Polygonscan, a comprehensive blockchain explorer and analytics tool which offers insight into the wider Polygon blockchain network, further information emerged on Arctida’s wallet.

On the explorer, it is possible to see all the transactions conducted through the wallet. Prigovor claims that Shumanov “constantly receives rewards” on this wallet, whereas the transaction history that we found only shows eight transactions, all of which are only received assets.

Seven of these transactions are so-called ‘crypto airdrops’, a strategy used by blockchain startups to distribute coins or tokens on a daily or regular basis to specific wallets without asking for them. These are usually used as a promotional tool by various platforms to generate interest in their projects and their value is never guaranteed or negligible. Six of these tokens come from the same provider, Maticslot Com. As Arctida’s wallet address is public on its website, it is possible that its address was gained by these startups through web scraping.

The last transaction, which is the only meaningful one, is a transfer of $200,00 from a wallet named 0xmasha.x, an account also found on platform X as a NFT enthusiast.

Although the $200.00 were received in USD Coin by this account, the amount has not been withdrawn and has been sitting in the wallet since May 2023, showing no evidence that cryptocurrency is “financing” Arctida’s operations. Prigovor shares screenshots of other transactions in its article, yet these do not appear in our search. Despite this, the shared transactions look very similar to the other crypto airdrops received in Arctida’s account. In other words, the only transactions we could find on Arctida’s wallets, or have been shared by Prigovor, are spam.

The article by Prigovor attempts to defame Shumanov “who has been fighting for ‘transparency’ in Russia for more than ten years” for engaging with cryptocurrency and fraudulent activities through the narrative of dubious finances. No evidence however is available to prove this point. Similar accusations had been previously directed towards Alexei Navalny, where he was accused of receiving $1.400.000 from Western funds in bitcoin. Further accusations of suspected corruption and dubious finances against Shumanov, “the anti-corruption fighter”, are raised in the article.

The information of the article was shared in November 2024, following Shumanov’s participation in the Warsaw Human Dimension Conference 2024 held from 30 September to 11 October in Poland, where this may have sparked an interest in his work relating to indigenous rights through social media platforms relating to the event.

December: the escalation

The third media attack against Arctida and its founder Ilia Shumanov took place on 21 December 2024, with the articleHow the West discredits Arctic projects of the Russian Federation’ first published by Rybar, a pro-Kremlin website and Telegram channel with nearly 1.3 million subscribers. Here, the project Arctida is presented as “one of the pillars of such propaganda” being directed towards “Russia’s actions in the Arctic and its supposedly destructive work with the northern peoples.”

Frequent NATO exercises are described as “frank provocations” alongside alleged media campaigns conducted against Russian practices in the Arctic. Within this landscape, Arctida is defined as “another tool for media pressure that legalises and distributes the theses needed by its grantor through a grid of loyal pro-Western media”, conspiring around the organisation’s Western and anti-Russian ties.

Arctida is then described through an elaborate graph named “Who creates a negative image of Russia’s Arctic projects”, illustrating the entanglements of its founders, Ilia Shumanov and Marina Guryeva, with organisations including the CIA, MI6 and Mikhail Khodorkovsky’s foundations.

Here, the investigative organisation is accused of the twofold objectives of creating “an unfavourable information space around Russian Arctic projects” and “support[ing] and spread[ing] separatist sentiments in the northern regions of the Russian Federation.” Shumanov is then connected to his previous role as head of the Russian branch of Transparency International, classed as an undesirable organisation in Russia, with connections to the CIA, MI5 and Open Society Foundations. No evidence is provided on behalf of Rybar to prove this, and upon enquiry Shumanov clarified that Arctida had not received funding from these sources. Marina Guryeva, on the other hand, is framed as a board member of the Pristaniste Foundation, which is false information.

It is pointed out that Arctida also collaborates with Reforum Space Vilnius, a community center supporting exiled Russian journalists, NGOs and activists, allegedly “funded by the U.S. State Department through Khodorkovsky’s foundations.”  Together they initiated the ‘Accelerator of Arctic Projects’ initiative. The article cites the project Ark as having ties to the other mentioned organisations. This project was founded by Russian lawyer and human rights activist Anastasia Burakova in 2022 to provide shelters, psychological support, free language courses and more services to immigrant Russians in other countries. The organisation received initial funding by the Anti-War Committee, a movement against Putin’s rule and the war in Ukraine founded by Khodorkovsky, among other exiled Russian public figures.

Collaborations with “a network of foreign agent media” are also highlighted, citing media outlets such as The Moscow Times, Meduza and Novaya Gazeta whose work has been outlawed or restricted due to their anti-Kremlin views. Criminal prosecutions are in place for those who collaborate with or have links to these ‘undesirable’ organisations. Below is an English translation of the same graph, which was shared in other languages on media outlets including Pravda UK, part of a Russian state-backed network aiming to spread disinformation globally through fake news sites. The objectives of the investigative organisation are defined as “discrediting Russian projects in the region and promoting sanctions, as well as disseminating theses on harassment of the indigenous peoples of the north by Moscow.” Fear is also expressed as to how Arctida’s investigations may affect Russia’s political and economic situation via its founders and “spread the decolonisation agenda.” Shumanov explains that this refers to any cooperation with indigenous groups, which is perceived to be a threat to national integrity on behalf of the Russian government.

Accusations of Arctida using cryptocurrencies are also brought back into the picture, specifically to “receive and draw up grants from various Western organisations” by making them appear as raised through crowdfunding rather than directly received from government budgets. Despite the fact it is not possible to receive grants in cryptocurrency, Arctida’s list of funders shows that these have been received from journalist grants in Europe, as well as other non-profit organisations.

Rybar’s article then highlights how Arctida’s investigations are “laying the foundation for various subversive processes against Russia”, particularly by convincing “the masses that Russia exacerbates the effects of global warming, sabotages the work of the world scientific community, and harasses the small indigenous peoples of the North.” The work of the media and research organisation, it continues, supports the development of sanctions and economic restrictions against Russia in the West, while justifying “the militarization of the Nordic countries, as well as the seizure of land and resources of the Arctic region.” This highlights how Russian media is attempting to portray the West as undermining Arctic sovereignty of the country.

This article published on 21 December 2024 received the most attention compared to the others, versions of which have been shared by pro-Kremlin news-like websites  Podolyaka and  Pravda UK, as well as pro-Kremlin Telegram channels, including Hungarian Oroszok Az Igazsag Oldalan, Rybar (Russian, English, Spanish and Italian channels), Two Majors and InfoDefenseESPANOL. Distributed across the various Telegram channels, the disinformation article from Rybar was shared with at least 1.4 million subscribers.

Only a few days later, another post with the title ‘The heavy footsteps of foreign agents’ was shared on the Telegram channel Captain of the Arctic, which has around 6.800 followers, highlighting recent activities of Shumanov and how foreign agents abroad “continue to operate stealthily.” Arctida’s investigations are defined as “pure negativity with a touch of masochism”, as “Russian people” produce this work “but with American money”. The post then claims that “[Russia’s] access to foreign audiences has been bought from all sides. But Russia’s actions speak better than hundreds of NGOs.”

Disinformation narratives

The news articles and Telegram posts analysed for this investigation demonstrate disinformation narratives typically used against Russian independent journalists, activists and political opponents by the Russian government and pro-Kremlin voices. Ilia Shumanov and the anti-corruption and climate work of Arctida are no exception to this.

Articles and posts containing disinformation narratives targeting Shumanov and Arctida were mapped using the social media monitoring tool Gerulata. Shumanov also contributed by providing information on published articles and Telegram channels that had been identified and mapped by his team throughout the disinformation campaigns. All material was cross-verified using the original websites and Telegram channels of publication, and when necessary, mapped using Yandex or Google Image Search.

When searching Gerulata for news articles and Telegram posts mentioning Ilia Shumanov or Arctida, we found content targeting the organisation, team members and its founder, dated between 12 September and 24 December 2024. Further articles and posts targeting Shumanov while he was head of the Russian branch of Transparency International were found from 10 June 2022 to 5 October 2023. A discourse analysis was conducted on the articles to identify the primary disinformation narratives.

Main Themes

Foreign Agent: Subversive Foreign Intelligence

Ilia Shumanov is repeatedly labeled as a foreign agent and also framed as evading Russian laws or hiding his status. He is “recognised by the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation as an individual performing the functions of a foreign agent” and Arctida is described to be “run by Ilia Shumanov, the former head of Transparency International […] and a foreign agent.” Most Telegram posts analysed also contain the hashtags #foreignagent and, sometimes, #pests, used metaphorically to describe perceived internal adversaries. The foreign agent rhetoric is known to sow distrust of fellow citizens and the West. A 2023 study by the independent research organisation Levada Center (itself labeled a foreign agent) revealed that many Russians accept the idea of foreign agents posing a threat: 52% of the respondents believed the foreign agent law aimed to limit the West’s negative influence on Russia, while 24% saw the law as a tool for political repression. Only two years prior to the study, almost twice as many supported the latter claim. Declaring someone a ‘foreign agent’ is a commonly used strategy for the Russian government to discredit and isolate dissenting voices of civil society. The law has been used to persecute anti-corruption and human rights activists and experts, including Oyub Titiyev, Ivan Golunov and Alexei Navalny. Also, by portraying Arctida as a project led by one person, this aims to undermine the work actually conducted by a team of professionals who stand behind the organisation’s work: this implicitly contributes to adding further disinformation about the organisation and its work.

Nationalist Rhetoric: Separatist Sentiments

Arctida is portrayed not as a civic organization and independent media outlet, made up of experts and journalists who remain anonymous on this occasion, but as a covert proxy engaged in destabilizing Russia from abroad. The Arctic Accelerator project initiated by Arctida in collaboration with Reforum Space Vilnius claimed to be a “separatist school […] under the guise of democratisation […] designed to instil separatist sentiments among the peoples of the North.” The separatist rhetoric is further implied by stating how the initiatives and reporting of Arctida has no connections, contacts and projects with the Ministry of the Russian Federation for the development of the Far East and the Arctic.

Conspiracy and Western ties: spreading the decolonisation agenda

Both Shumanov and Arctida are portrayed as linked to foreign powers. The disinformation campaign employed on a range of Telegram channels states that Arctida is “one of the mouthpieces of Western propaganda” and “just another tool for media pressure”, particularly when it comes to the “harassment of the indigenous peoples of the north by Moscow.” In this sense, it contributes to spreading the ‘decolonisation agenda’. Additionally, most articles and posts allege that Ilia Shumanov and Arctida’s associated activities have been financed by Western actors, including the CIA, USAID, and “oligarch-in-waiting Mr. Mikhail Khodorkovsky.” No evidence is provided however to substantiate these claims and prove these connections exist within any of the publications.

This narrative is proven effective in the above comment, which was found under one of Arctida’s investigation posts during the Gerulata analysis. Accusations of “Russophobic”, “Nazi” and foreign intelligence affiliations appear to have become part of public discourse. The conspiratorial framing which ties Shumanov to an inimical Western elite aims to amplify fears of subversion and undermine the objectivity and trustworthiness of Shumanov’s investigations related to environmental issues in the Russian Arctic.

Dubious Finances: Crypto Fraud and Anti-Corruption?

Shumanov is linked to suspicious cryptocurrency schemes in the article published by Prigovor. This serves the purpose of character assassination by calling his moral and financial integrity into question. This narrative also distracts from the real issue at stake and deflects attention back onto Shumanov, as the conversation shifts from his investigations to his supposed failings. The article claims “Shumanov himself is hooked on semi-fraudulent projects in the field of cryptocurrencies” and  “throughout its existence, his wallet has received only 200 real dollars. The rest are ‘tokens’ of projects that, if not directly fraudulent, are definitely ‘murky’.” By casting doubt on his financial dealings and intelligence, there are attempts to delegitimize his work and competence, particularly since he’s involved in anti-corruption and transparency efforts: “The very fact that a specialist in ‘transparency’ and anti-corruption is willing to fall for a blatant ‘press a button to get 100.000’ scam raises serious doubts about his competence.” Furthermore, the ambiguous and emotionally loaded wordings “semi-fraudulent”, “murky” and “blatant scam” plant suspicion in the reader without substantiating these claims with evidence. No facts proving wrongdoing are presented.

Personal Information: the warning

The use of sensitive personal information in this case presents not only a major personal attack, but also a way of promoting further disinformation. Through his passport photo, Shumanov is accused of manipulating Russia’s diplomatic channels to renew his passport: although he was put on the wanted list by the Ministry of Internal Affairs four months later, he was not declared such at the time and it would be illegal to refuse to issue him a new passport. In Pigovor’s article, it is claimed that “curiously, the Arctida founder received his passport in April 2024, and four months later the Russian Interior Ministry declared him wanted.” This continues by stating that “thanks to what connections the foreign agent Shumanov managed to renew his passport on time and without problems remains a mystery.” This makes it appear as though Shumanov was engaging in inappropriate behaviour by “circumventing” current legislation, sowing further doubt and disinformation on his activities.

Undermining Arctic Sovereignty

Arctida’s work is consistently interpreted as an attack on Russia’s geopolitical and territorial claims in the Arctic. Examples can be found in the claims that the organisation’s investigations “challenge the right of the Russian Federation to claim the Arctic, the Northern Sea Route and the sea shelves”, and “spread the belief that Russia is exacerbating the consequences of global warming [and] oppressing the small indigenous peoples of the North.” The Russian Federation has been an active member of the Arctic Council since its foundation in 1996. Since the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, however, the member states (U.S., Canada, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Iceland and Russia) have not met in a political or diplomatic manner, and around 130 common projects were abandoned. In February 2024, Russia threatened to leave the Arctic Council if its operations did not align with its interests. A few months later, a limited cooperation between Russia and Western countries in the Arctic was initiated, and in recent months it has been claimed that joint projects between the U.S. and Russia are needed.

The narrative centered around threats to sovereignty in some way contradicts the international ties that Russian authorities have maintained throughout the years and are attempting to re-establish in the Arctic. This has used disinformation to communicate with a domestic audience, as well as selected audiences abroad (for example, through Russian Telegram groups in other languages and countries). This strategy of filtering information around threats to national sovereignty for an international audience has proven effective. The EU and NATO are framed as the primary international actors in these narratives, particularly accusing them of employing disinformation campaigns and military exercises to undermine Russian sovereignty in the region. The same strategies are used against internal actors in Russia, apparent in the accusations that Arctida supports the development of sanctions and economic restrictions against Russia in the West, while justifying militarisation in the European Nordics and the ‘seizure’ of resources in the Arctic.

Actors behind the disinformation

The primary websites and channels disseminating these narratives are here mapped, and linked to related actors when possible.

Rybar

Telegram is a major news source for Russian-speaking audiences, and Rybar’s Russian channel has closer to 1.3 million followers. The network of channels include other languages, such as English, German, Spanish and Italian. Rybar published the article alleging connections between Shumanov and Western intelligence agencies such as the CIA and MI6, while also accusing Arctida of promoting separatist sentiments. Rybar is a pro-Russia military analysis news outlet primarily posting on Russia’s involvement in conflicts such as the war in Ukraine on its Telegram channels.

Among pro-Russian channels, Rybar stands out as a key source of information for analysts and media outlets. It publishes several detailed daily reports on various combat zones, often accompanied by rapidly updated and highly detailed maps. Its data has been cited by international media, including CNN and Bloomberg. Despite being one of the most popular military channels on Telegram, the creators remained anonymous for a long time. In 2022, independent Russian news outlet The Bell identified the newsroom’s two administrators as ​​Mikhail Zvinchuk, a military Arabic translator and former employee of the Russian Ministry of Defense’s press service, and Denis Shchukin, a computer programmer from Moscow. They are self-declared as one “military interpreter [and] OSINT specialist” and one “political strategist, a member of the old aristocracy.”

The Bell also disclosed that Rybar earned money from advertising, and among its customers were Russia Today, FAN (formerly part of Patriot Media Group, owned by Yevgeny Prigozhin who also founded the infamous “troll factory” Internet Research Agency in St. Petersburg), and a network of anonymous pro-Kremlin channels, the so-called Z-channels, which are allegedly linked to the state-run ‘Russia – Land of Opportunity foundation and Sergei Kiriyenko, who is First Deputy Chief of Staff of the Presidential Executive Office. “It’s unusual that a news site covering military reports about Arctida – maybe they link our reporting to national security as it goes against the development of the North,” says Shumanov.

Prigovor.ru

Prigovor published the article disseminating Shumanov’s passport information. Shumanov mentions that these kinds of propagandistic news sites are called ‘Pomayka’, so-called “garbage news” outlets, where ‘military-patriotic’ content that aligns with Kremlin views is passed on from above for publication. These are usually a mix of reels, facts and lies and the site publishes posts irregularly. Based on the content shared by Prigovor and following our analysis, the outlet seems to share elements of this phenomenon, including access to information we assume is coming from authorities. It is unknown who owns or runs Prigovor, as well as who funds and informs the site.

When asked why Prigovor, rather than a more reputable news outlet with a larger audience, published the article discrediting Arctida and its founder, Shumanov explains that official media would face legal repercussions for disseminating information that is so clearly inaccurate and defamatory. “Nobody cares if Prigovor is closed down for publishing the article”, he says. While direct ties between the Russian government and Prigovor cannot be proven, the website’s content and perspectives are critical of opposition figures and align closely with pro-Kremlin views.

RT

The Russian news outlet RT (former Russia Today), which published the first article on Arctida’s ‘Accelerator of Arctic Projects’, contributes to fostering disinformation about Russia’s northern regions and has been recognised for spreading Kremlin’s propaganda internationally and for election interference across various continents. For example, an investigation by BBC News Russia found that RT has been involved in “turning African journalists into Kremlin mouthpieces” by sharing tools presumed to “fight fake news” and educate on fact-checking, all while sharing state-run propaganda. After having been banned in different countries including the U.K., European Union, Canada and U.S., the media outlet turned to training foreign journalists in China, South-East Asia and Africa as a way of spreading disinformation. Similar propagandistic aims have been reported in the Balkan region, after the RT Balkan desk was established in Serbia in 2022.

Since its establishment in 2005, the propaganda outlet has become a network of broadcasting, websites and social media channels publishing in Russian, English, Arabic, French, Spanish, Serbian and German. Headquartered in Moscow, RT was assigned only $30 million from the Kremlin to begin its operation, which then became $300 million in 2011 and $400 million in 2014. In 2017, it was reported that the Kremlin spends $190 million a year for distributing the channel via cable broadcasting and satellite in hotels across the world.

Pravda UK

The Rybar article published on December 21, 2024, was also reposted on the UK-based site of the The Pravda Network, which is an inauthentic network of hundreds of news aggregator sites that has been disseminating pro-Kremlin content since 2014. The network is known for echoing pro-Kremlin state media and Telegram channels, aiming to sway public opinion far beyond Russia’s borders.

The DFRLab, in collaboration with Finland-based CheckFirst, found that the network has targeted over 80 countries and regions, often relying heavily on machine translation to distribute its messages. Their investigation also reveals how content from Russia’s Pravda network spreads through platforms like Wikipedia citations, X (formerly Twitter) Community Notes, and AI chatbot-generated conversations. In addition, it was discovered that Pravda network domains are frequently referenced as sources, with their claims reposted across the above mentioned platforms. Analysis using API access to Wikipedia and X revealed a sharp surge in posts containing links to Pravda network domains following February 24, 2022. This raises red flags about how Russian disinformation is creeping into mainstream spaces, polluting trusted online sources and raising serious concerns about the dissemination of false narratives on a global scale.

Conclusions

The disinformation narratives and actors involved in the information campaigns against Ilia Shumanov and Arctida emphasise the importance of the Arctic region in this historical moment. The only proven state-funded media here considered is RT, which reflects the voice of the Russian government. The alignment of other channels with pro-Kremlin views, however, at least proves the importance of this region not only for Russian sovereignty, but for the international context, as the melting ice is opening up new geopolitical and strategic opportunities globally.

The attacks against Ilia Shumanov occurred at a time when interests in the region were growing. Since February 2025, there have been no further developments in the campaigns targeting Shumanov and Arctida, and one possible reason could be that Russian and U.S. Arctic policies have become more aligned. “Maybe it is a coincidence, but this could be due to the feeling that the Arctic is becoming increasingly important [in the geopolitical arena] and any inaccurate step could destroy this fragile environment, so they decided to step out of the agenda aiming to punish organisations working in the region,” says Shumanov.

It is telling that the accusations against Shumanov have not only followed the most common narratives used against journalists and human rights advocates, such as involvement in corruption, but also have been consistently centered around Shumanov’s link to separatism, intelligence and foreign powers. The disinformation strategies employed by the actors fit into the Russian playbook of disinformation, highlighting however the intersection between environmental welfare, indigenous rights and geopolitical power. In other words, the Russian Arctic is becoming home to hybrid warfare struggles where indigenous rights are increasingly becoming a national and international security issue.

This political landscape has important consequences on the practice of independent environmental journalism in the Arctic. As press freedom and human rights are being increasingly called into question in the Russian Arctic, their importance for the important work of journalists who are pushing for the Arctic to become part of the public agenda remains unhindered. “Indigenous communities and climate issues are currently not on the high plane as the war, which everybody is writing about, but the people who are living somewhere in Chukotka should be in the interest of the media. We have to understand what is happening there,” states Shumanov. “We’re talking about the dark side of the Arctic.”

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